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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
Supreme Court Consolidated
Case No.: 20060508-SC
GRAHAM AUSTIN,
Petitioner.

REPT 7 BRIEF OF PETITIONER AUSTIN

ARGUMENT
!• liATE_Vi^JEYES, MAY APPLY RETROACTIVELY BUT NOT IN THE
INSTANT MATTER
In the BriefofResponde.nl ihc Stun- .lrpur: lha< HM- rase of State v. Reves. 2005 UT
33, 116 P.3d 305, should be applied retroactively to the instant matter and that State
preservation rules apply.

;/ of Respondent-atr

^

A. Retroactive
"Exceptional circumstances are explained as "those which would explain and excuse
a party's failure to raise a claimed error in the trial court." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65 (Utah
Vl ! W i

!li> exception;*! »<icumstancc* uiikifil

w:> ,r, n saleh di-viu

in assure

that manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider m i^suc on rippe.il." State
v. Archambeau 820 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah App. 1991).

Unlike "plain error," "exceptional circumstances" is not so much a precise
doctrine, which may be analyzed in terms of fixed elements, as it is a
descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate court's judgment that even
though an issue was not raised below and even though the plain error doctrine
does not apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit
consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal.
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). In State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, (Utah 19941
this Court employed the "exceptional circumstances" rubric where a change in law or the
settled interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial.
The Petitioner concedes that retroactivity may apply with regards to the decision of
this Court in Reyes regarding the reasonable doubt jury instruction under the analysis of the
State, However, retroactivity does not apply to the instant matter because Austin's trial was
held prior to the change in the law and his appeal followed that change in the law. These
types of circumstances require application of the exceptional circumstances rubric.
The issue of retroactivity is not properly before this Court and therefore, this Court
need not address it. Austin did not raise the issue in his petition and the State has not filed
a cross-petition arguing retroactivity. Therefore, retroactivity does not need to be addressed
by this Court. Such a determination of retroactivity could potentially open the flood gates
for anyone who had previously followed Robertsonfrom1997 to 2005 to file petitions under
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act for relief. Although retroactivity may apply to those who
had exhausted all of their appeals prior to the decision in Reves. retroactivity does not apply
to Austin or those who had their trial prior to the decision in Reyes and then filed their
appeals subsequent to the decision therein because those appeals where not yet exhausted at
2

the time of the decision. This is a matter where the exceptional circumstances rubric clearly
applies,
B.

Retroactivity Does Not Require Preservation but Rather is an Exception
to the Rule

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-35a-104(2), which is contained in the Post-Convictions

Mi "Hied \ Aol. (lis iiissestheidMiut In illh. mlc In IK iiii I 111 ill nl'inii ml JLild illlwl 'I ill In, question
of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule announced by the United States
Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or I Jtah Cour I: of ..Appeals after the petitioner's
conviction became final shall be governed ;- applicable state and federal principles of
retroactivity." Relief ii(? specifically excluded under the Po^M^nviction^ Wrmcdv Act,
however, as follows:
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for postconviction relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a
previous request for post-conviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 7835a-107.
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-35a-106. Therefore, the retroactivity rule as dictated in §78-35a-104(2),
regarding a change in the law is clearly is reserved for those(a) who had the change of law
occur after their conviction; (b) who could not raise the issue on direct appeal; and (c) whose
conviction is final

In Griffith v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the
State's argument regarding whether a change in law occurring between an individual's trial
and appeal should be entertained by the trial courts or not, as follows:
In Justice Harlan's view, and now in ours, failure to apply a newly declared
constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic
norms of constitutional adjudication. First, it is a settled principle that this
Court adjudicates only "cases" and "controversies." See U.S. Const., Art. Ill,
§ 2. Unlike a legislature, we do not promulgate new rules of constitutional
criminal procedure on a broad basis. Rather, the nature of judicial review
requires that we adjudicate specific cases, and each case usually becomes the
vehicle for announcement of a new rule. But after we have decided a new rule
in the case selected, the integrity ofjudicial review requires that we apply that
rule to all similar cases pending on direct review. Justice Harlan observed:
"If we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in light
of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles,
it is difficult to see why we should so adjudicate any case at
a l l - In truth, the Court's assertion ofpower to disregard current
law in adjudicating cases before us that have not already run the
full course of appellate review, is quite simply an assertion that
our constitutional function is not one of adjudication but in
effect of legislation." Mackev v. United States. 401 U.S., at 679,
91 S.Ct, at 1173 (opinion concurring in judgment).
As a practical matter, of course, we cannot hear each case pending on direct
review and apply the new rule. But we fulfill our judicial responsibility by
instructing the lower courts to apply the new rule retroactively to cases not yet
final. Thus, it is the nature ofjudicial review that precludes usfrom"[s]imply
fishing one casefromthe stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for
pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of
similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule." Ibid. See
United States v. Johnson. 457 U.S., at 546-547,555,102 S.Ct., at 2585,2590.
Second, selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating
similarly situated defendants the same. See Desist v. United States. 394 U.S.,
at 258-259,89 S.Ct., at 1038-1039 (Harlan, J., dissenting). As we pointed out
in United States v. Johnson, the problem with not applying new rules to cases
4

pending on direct review is "the actual inequity that results when the Court
chooses which of many similarly situated defendants should be the chance
beneficiary 9 ' of a new rule. 457 U.S., at 556, n. 16, 102 S.Ct, at 2590, n. 16
(emphasis in original). Although the Court had tolerated this inequity for a
time by not applying new rules retroactively to cases on direct review, w e
noted: "The time for toleration has come to an end." Ibid.
In United States v. Johnson, our acceptance of Justice Harlan's views led to the
holding that "subject to [certain exceptions], a decision of this Court
construing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied retroactively to all
convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered " Id.,
at 562,102 S.Ct. at 2593.
Ibid, 479 U.S. 314, 322-324, 107 S.Ct. 708, 713, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). The Griffith v.
Kentucky ckx'i^iiiiiii ilrinimHcd thai Liu,* (\pc nl ,rohoaclivit> should apply to "to all similar
cases pending on direct re view. The Griffith v, Kentucky hold

uphHil Hy Utah's

exceptional circumstances rubric and is directly in line with the Utah Legislature's
declaration and intended use ot the \\**\ * **m ictions Remedy Act
The State's positi-

Jin linK implies m ILJ Sl.ili1 [ticson. ation

rules should not allow consideration _i -jiamis such as those raised b> Austin herein
necessarily creates '"the actual inequity that results when the Court chooses which of many
similarly siliiiili Il iilln In in ill iill . Jin Hi! IK I In r l i . i m v lintii I n m i y n l .i IU 1 %\ mull

I irilTitli 4 7 9

I J S. at 323, 107 S.Ct. at 713, citing Johnson, 457 U.S., at 556, u. 16, 102 S.Ct, at 2590, n.
16 (emphasis in original). This Court's Reyes decision informed Reyes, Cruz and Weaver
II in inn" holding iii'in iiiid issued in Robertson was Hawed and ifieit'ioa, iliac vuis I in benefit
to the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" and so they coi lid not use that phrase. While
the determination indirectly affected Reyes, Cruz and Weaver by simply determining their

lack of entitlement, Austin has been directly affected because the substantial risk this Court
discovered in Reyes exists in his case because of the use of that phrase. The phrase at issue
cannot be flawed for Reyes, Cruz and Weaver, but acceptable for Austin under the simple
doctrine of equity, particularly when this Court determined that the phrase violates Victor
standards, which are the guidelines to follow after this Court's abandonment of Robertson.
"The purpose of preservation is to allow the trial court the first chance at hearing
issues that may have arisen so that the appellate court does not become overwhelmed. "As
we explained in State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991), the purpose of the
preservation rule is to ensure that the trial court is first given an opportunity to decide if a
mistake has been made before appellate review becomes appropriate." State v. Pinder. 2005
UT 15 , f46,114 P.3d 551. The State attempt to circumnavigate the holdings in Griffith by
laying claim that a retroactive rule need be preserved under State laws governing
preservation; however, the State's analysis does not include any authority for this position.
Regardless, the State's argument fails based on the fact that the retroactive rule circumvents
the preservation rule by specifically stating that, ". . .failure to apply a newly declared
constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of
constitutional adjudication." Griffiths, 479 U.S. at 322,107 S.Ct. at 713. The United States
Supreme Court also sets forth its authority to dictate such a holding to the State courts by
stating that,".. .we fulfill our judicial responsibility by instructing the lower courts to apply
the new rule retroactively to cases not yet final." Id. The United States Supreme Court has

6

held that it will not tolerate such an inequity to occur. Id, 479 U.S. at 324,107 S.Ct. at 713.

of the issue as held by the United State Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S.
461,117S.Ct. 1544,1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), that "...where the law at the time of trial

'plain' at the time of appellate consideration." Id.
Ifthe exceptional circumstances rubric was not applied to this matter and preservation

prejudicial to Austin and would leave him without a remedy under which he could receive
post-conviction relief. In ordinary circumstances, the course of action would be for Austin

challenge to a conviction or sentence. However, these rules only apply to those whose
appeals have been exhausted. A change in the law that is of a constitutional nature does not
fall within the provision-^ Ii"tn1 within Ihr III I' < i" I' Enroll I his leaves Austin with
only two (2) choices to either file a petition for extraordinary relief under Rule 65c or file
a writ of habeas corpus. However, neither apply in this matter because Austin has not yet
exhausted all of his appeal, therefore, he still has an adequate remedy in which to have the
error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction corrected, a decision by this Court.
The question of the constitutionality of the reasonable doubt jury instruction that was
used at Austin's trial falls correctly

the Post-Convictions Remedy Act as set forth in

7

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-35a-104(l)(a). This statute sets forth the grounds upon which an

individual may file a petition or motion to obtain relief from a judgment that violated the
United States Constitution or the Utah Constitution. In this matter, the issue caused a
constitutional violation in that the reasonable doubt jury instruction that was used at Austin's
trial carried with it a substantial risk that Austin was convicted on a standard that is below
that of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard that is required by both the federal and state
constitutions.
Although Austin's case meets this criteria and he could potentially obtain relief under
these provisions, UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-35a-102 and -106 precludes him from doing so.
The Post-Convictions Remedy Act requires exhaustion of all other remedies under §78-3 5a102, and specifically requires raising the issues on direct appeal if the conviction is not yet
final under UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-35a-106. Austin cannot file a petition or motion under
the Act under UTAH CODE ANN. 78-35a-106(l)(a) because he could have and did raise the
issue of the reasonable doubt jury instruction on direct appeal after Reyes came down. If
Austin had not raised the issue on direct appeal, he could not have filed anything under the
Act under subsection (l)(c) since he would have failed to raise the issue. Basically, the
reasonable doubt jury instruction issue was properly raised on direct appeal by Austin under
the Act because he was still able to raise the issue when Reves came down. Because this was
and is the only way for Austin to raise this issue and because there is no other option to
remedy the situation, then an exception to the preservation requirement must exist. This

8

exception is the application of the exceptional circumstances rubric which has been applied

between the time of trial and the time of appeal.
This court cannot affirm the Utah Court of Appeals decision because this would
possibly n 0 t allow Austin to raise "the matter in any form of post-judgment mc I: ion because
the issue had already been decided by the Utah Court of Appeals.

UTAH CODE ANN.

78-35a-

106(l)(b). The Utah Court of Appeals, in essence, did not address this issue and instead

If this Court determines that the Utah Court of Appeals correctly applied the plain
error/exceptional circumstances rubric to Austin's case it will have essentially precluded

that was lower than that of beyond a reasonable doubt, when relief is available to all others
who had exhausted their appeals before the decision came down in Reyes. Austin would not
be entitled to the same remedy because he had not exhausted his direct appeal prior to Reyes
and because the change in the law occurred between the time of trial and the filing of his
appeal, no retroactivity applies. The entire reason for the exceptional circumstances rubric
is for the appellate court to apply it in cases like these when there has clearly been a change
in the law between the time of trial and the time of appeal.

Because that is what has

occurred in this matter, there is no other option than for this Court to find that Hie except i«, i i u II
circumstances rubric applies.

9

If this Court were to rule that Reyes should be applied retroactively it would open the
flood gates for anyone who had been convicted under Robertson which was precedent for
over nine (9) years, to now bring an action to set aside their judgments because Reyes
overruled Robertson and is being applied retroactively. The State acknowledges this point
in the Brief of Respondent at p. 8. However, anyone with a case pending on direct review
when this Court issued its decision in Reyes should be allowed to benefit from the change
in the law.
Retroactive application of new laws occurs to protect the rights of those who have
previously been held to the now-abandoned holdings. In the instant matter, many people
have been subjected to reasonable-doubt jury instructions under State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d
1219 (Utah 1997) overruled in relevant part by State v.Reves. 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305,
which led to the substantial risk that they were found guilty based upon a standard that is
lower than that of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Allowing Reyes to be applied retroactively
would allow every person ever convicted under a reasonable-doubt jury instruction as set
forth in Robertson to file post-judgment motions for relief. This would not allow for the
efficient administration of justice because courts would be inundated with people asking for
their cases to be reviewed based upon the retroactivity of Reyes. Therefore, this Court
should decline to address the retroactivity of the holdings in Reyes..
The exceptional circumstances rubric should be applied to the instant matter.
Exceptional circumstances are explained as 'those which would explain and excuse a party's

10

App.1990). In State v.Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App.1992), the Utah Court of Appeals
employed the "exceptional circumstances" rubric where a change in law or the settled
interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial. The issue thus need

THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY
In the Briefof Respondent, the State argues that Austin did not preserve the issue of

Respondent si p. 16.
"The invited error doctrine prevents a party from inducing action by a court and later
seeking reversal on the ground that the requested action was error." U.S. v. Edward J.. 224
F.3d 1216, C.A.10, 2000, citin? United States v. Johnson. 183 F.3d 1175, 1178 n. 2 (10th

error committed at trial when that parry led the trial court into committing the error." State
Yj&nfl, 850 P.2d 1201,1220 (Utah 1993). There we explained that this rule, known as the

that the trial court should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error. Second, it
discourages partiesfromintentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden

State v.Dunn 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993).

11

"While the invited error doctrine is crafted to " 'discourage [ ] parties from
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on
appeal/ " it is also intended to give the trial court the first opportunity to address the claim
of error." State v. Geukgeuzian 2004 UT 16 f 12, 86 P.3d 742, quoting State v. Hamilton.
2003 UT 22,1 54, 70 P.3d 111 {quoting State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah
1996) (further citation omitted).
The invited error doctrine exists so that a defendant cannot lead a trial court into
committing an error and then use the error on appeal to have the conviction reversed.
However, the invited error exists to avoid errors that are intentional, not that a defendant has
no control over. In the instant matter, Austin did not invite the error. At the time of his trial,
no error existed and the reasonable-doubt jury instruction requested by trial counsel was the
one that was correct at the time based upon precedent. An attorney can only rely on current
case law at the time of trial as nothing else exists on which to base their argument. An
attorney is not clairvoyant, they cannot determine what a higher court will decide and how
that may affect their current case and to expect them to do so. As mentioned above and
detailed further below, this would lead attorneys to raise a long list of useless objections
opposing circumstances clearly supported by existing precedent. The invited error doctrine
exists to protect individuals from errors that are intentional at the time of trial, not that are
out of the control of the defendant. Austin had no control over whether this Court would
overturn Robertson thereby rendering the reasonable-doubt jury instruction used at his trial

12

invite the error
It is also not possible to invite an error when the State in this matter asked for the
same instruction. When Austin's counsel asked that the word "obviate* be used in the

instructions had included the word eliminate. Tr. Vol. II at p. 128. The State commented that
it also wanted the word eliminated used and did not object to the use of the word "obviate."

also asked that the same instruction be used. Therefore, no error was invited because no
error existed at the time oftrial. Ihe error was created between the time of trial and the time
of Austin's appeal and because a change in the law cm c c i i tired during that time the exceptional
circumstances rubric or manifest injustice apply in this matter and not the invited error
doctrine
This court has previous determined the meaning of manifest injustice, <4we held that
M

in most circumstances the term 'manifest injustice1 is synonymous with the 'plain error*
s^pis;- -

=.

I, 111

.4tc" State v. Casev. 2003 UT 55,140, 82 P.3d 1106, citing Slate v.

7 0 P.2d

116, 121-22 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989)). Although

13

circumstances rubric that applies in this matter because of the change in the law. Therefore,
the invited error doctrine does not apply in this matter.
In the Brief of Respondent the state relies on the case of State v. Benny Lopez 886
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994) to show that preservation still applies to cases that are pending on
appeal when a change of law occurs. Brief of Respondent at p. 20. However, the State fails
to mention that Lopez did not argue exceptional circumstances on his appeal, he presented
the argument of a liberty interest. Lopez did not argue exceptional circumstances. This
differentiates his case from the instant matter. In the instant matter, Austin argued
exceptional circumstances not that a liberty interest was being affected. Therefore, the State
cannot reply on Lopez in this matter because the principles upon which Lopez based his
appeal are not the same as they are in the instant matter.

III. AUSTIN'S TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KNOW
THAT ROBERTSON WAS VULNERABLE AND MAY BE OVERRULED
In the Brief of the Respondent the State attempts to argue that no exceptional
circumstances exist in this matter because trial counsel knew that Robertson may have been
constitutionally flawed and that Reyes was pending on certiorari. Brief of Respondent at p.
28.
In the first State v. Reves. 84 P.3d 841 (Utah App.2004), the State argued that the
three-part test as set forth by this Court in Robertson was not based on constitutionality and
this diminished its significance and asked the Court of Appeals to overrule Robertson. The
Court of Appeals ruled that it did not believe that Robertson was in accordance with the
14

precedence set forth in Victor v. Nebraska,.

the matter for a new trial. Hie State then mcu a r e u i ^

1239, 127 LJM.2d.583

K

l

^;

'ari that was

granted on May 26, 2004.
Although Austin's 'trial occurred after Certiorari was granted in Reyes. Ausl in' s trial

value. Had Austin's trial counsel objected based upon a case that was pending in this court,
the trial court would not have delayed the decision it made at trial in order to see what the

at trial it was relying on Robertson because at the time of trial Robertson was the case that
had precedential value and the issue created b> the Reves decision would 'have been

of a pending case, this is the reason a person is allowed to take up on appeal an issue that was
created by a change in the law from the time of trial to the time of appeal, hence exceptional
i. i i' 1111 is lances

>: :e "exceptional circumstances* rubric [may be employed] where a change

in law or the settled interpretation ol' h v\ < olor| s11 (lie failure h • \u\ r raised an issiu .ii It
State ex rel. T.M.. 2003 U T App 1 9 1 4 1 6 , 73 P. 3d 959. citing State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5.10
(I Hah Ct.App.19%), I i do otherwise would create the "virtually useless laundr> lists of
objections 11 .is disrussnl in Johnson v. United States, VMI 11

In I I ih I I ' " I I I "I I,

1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). Because pending eases have no precedential value, Austin's

",

trial counsel had no duty to know that Robertson was vulnerable and could possibly be
overturned by this Court, therefore, they had not duty or reason to object to the jury
instruction at trial.
IV.

THE ROBERTSON TEST DIMINISHED THE STATE'S BURDEN AND
WAS NOT FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENSE

In the Brief of Respondent, the State attempts to argue that the three-part test as set
forth in Robertson raised the State's burden ofproof making it more beneficial to Austin than
harmful. Brief ofRespondent at pp. 7-8.
This is untrue. In this Court's decision in Reyes it discussed how the Robertson test
and the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" diminished the state's burden.
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of proof
necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor standard. The
"obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: the identification
of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt against the evidence.
This process suggests a back and forth disputation of a doubt's merits, all to
the end of determining whether the evidence is sufficient to "obviate" the
doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not, however,
condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability either to
articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated conviction that
the State has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as a legitimate basis
to acquit.
Reyes 2005 UT 33, f27. If a juror had a doubt and could weigh that doubt against the
evidence to determine if the evidence could extinguish the doubt it would allow the State to
present evidence of a diminished burden because it would not have to provide proof that met
the burden of beyond a reasonable doubt. For the State to meet the burden of beyond a
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reasonable doubt a juror cannot have any doubts that they would weigh against the evidence,

reasonable doubt. Therefore, Robertson diminished the burden of the State in having to
~~— -* crime or act occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not raise the burden to the

based upon a lower standard.
In the Briefofthe Respondent the State also attempts to argue that Robertson is more

U I133, f30, pointed out, using the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt'1' carried with it the
substantial risk that a juror could convict someone based upon a standard that was lower than
lliijl ol beyond a reasonable doi ill: il: Creating a substantial risk that an accused could be

defense favorable because this could allow an accused to be convicted based upon a lower
standard. I herefore, Robertson was not defense favorable and Austin ran the risk that he was

V.

EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT ENCOMPASS THE PLAIN
ERROR STANDARD

In the Brief of the Respondent the State attempts to argue that if this Court, finds that
exceptionalciru"'»iMain/es apply (kti Iy - •»I f•»- llvi v|" iiij>;\ f plum mor ,1b1 yy\\

i|,l||l|,

n/

of Respondent at p. 8, 31. By making this argument the State is attempting to change the
exceptional circumstances rubric as it applies in Ulitli
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Plain error and exceptional circumstances cannot exist together. "Unlike "plain
error," "exceptional circumstances" is not so much a precise doctrine, which may be analyzed
in terms of fixed elements, as it is a descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate court's
judgment that even though an issue was not raised below and even though the plain error
doctrine does not apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit consideration
of the merits of the issue on appeal." State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 8, (Utah App.,1996)
(emphasis added). Exceptional circumstances is what is applied when the prongs of the plain
error doctrine cannot be met, yet an error still exists, therefore, they cannot exist as one and
the same.
"In general, to establish the existence ofplain error and to obtain appellate relief from
an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i)
An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome
for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." State
v.Dunn 850 P.2d 120lOJtah. 1993V see State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116,122 (Utah 1989); State
v. Bell. 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988); State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah
1987V State v.Fontana. 680P.2d 1042,1048 (Utah 1984);^ea/5oElc!redge,773P.2dat3536;cf. UTAHRJEVID. 103(d); UTAHRXRIM.P. 19(C). If any one of these requirements is not
met, plain error is not established. Cf. State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992);
Verde. 770 P.2d at 123. The State concedes that the second prong of the plain error doctrine
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cannot be met because the error was not obvious to the trial court. Briefof Respondent at p.
31. Because the second prong requires that an error be obvious to the trial court it can never
be met in circumstances were there has been a substantial change in the law between the time
of trial and the time of appeal because at the time of trial there was no error, making these
circumstances exceptional. The State contends that the first and third prong of the plain error
doctrine can still be met, however, as stated above in, if all three prongs of the plain error
doctrine are not met, plain error has not been established. Not only can the second prong not
be met but neither can the first and third prong of the plain error doctrine. The first prong
requires that an error exist at the time of trial, however, no error existed in this matter at the
time of trial, it was not until the change in the law under Reves that the error was came into
existence. The third prong can also not be met because the harm in this matter is the
substantial risk that was created by using the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" and it is
impossible to see what the potential effects of this phrase were on the juror's minds.
Therefore, none of the three prongs of the plain error doctrine are met in this matter so
exceptional circumstances is the only rubric that can apply.
The Utah Court of Appeals applied the Utah plain error doctrine when it rendered its
decision in this matter, when it is the federal plain error standard on appeal as set forth in
Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. 461,117 S.Ct. 1544,1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), that
should have been applied to the instant matter. In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court
stated, that "...where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law
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at the time of appeal—it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate
consideration." Id. The use of the word "plain" in Johnson does not require an undertaking
of Utah's three-prong plain error doctrine. Instead determining what plain error may exist
at the time of appeal requires a two-step undertaking. First, did the law change and second
did the change in the law create an error. The second prong in Johnson only requires that an
error was created based upon a change in the law at the time of appeal, not at the time of trial.
Harm does not have to be established as that is best left to be determined by an ultimate
decision on the merits of the issue. Because the reasonable doubt jury instruction standard
changed between the time of Austin's trial and the time he filed his appeal and because the
change in that law created an error, this error should be reviewed under the Utah's
exceptional circumstances rubric and the test as set forth in Johnson. Because the three
prongs of Utah's plain error doctrine have not been met, plain error does not exist.
VI.

HARM IS NOT NECESSARY TO REVIEW THE ERROR

In the Brief of the Respondent the State argues that if this court determines that
exceptional circumstances apply to this matter, that the third prong of the plain error test,
harm, also applies and that Austin has not shown how he was harmed in this matter. Brief
ofRespondent at p. 8. The harm in this matter is the use of the phrase "obviate all reasonable
doubt" and the substantial risk it carried that a jury would convict Austin based upon a
standard of that which is below a reasonable doubt. The risk is the harm because no one
knows what was in the jury's mind or how they may have interpreted or come to a conclusion
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of the evidence based upon the reasonable doubt jury instruction given at trial. No one
knows if a jury tried to weigh doubt against the evidence to overcome a doubt or if they were
really convinced that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Austin committed
the crime. The United States Constitution supports the idea that a guilty man should go free
if there exists any doubt instead of an innocent man being punished. Therefore, it is best to
err on the side of caution and hold that if a jury instruction carries any form of a substantial
risk that the instruction does not belong in the courtroom. Because the phrase "obviate all
reasonable doubt" carried with it a substantial risk (harm) that Austin was convicted based
upon a standard of below a reasonable doubt, no harm needs to be shown because the risk
existed in the use of that very phrase.
VII.

REYES COMPLETELY OVERRULED ROBERTSON

In the Brief of Respondent, the State attempts to argue that this Court's ruling in Reyes
only overturned the Robertson test and not the jury instruction as set forth in Robertson.
Brief ofRespondent at p. 8.
At the time of the decision in Robertson, the jury instruction given was okay because
it conveyed the message of "obviate all reasonable doubt" to the jury even though it did not
use that phrase. "Obviate all reasonable doubt" was not required to be used as a phrase in
reasonable doubt jury instructions until after Robertson had been decided so the jury
instruction used at Robertson's trial was not required to contain that language. This Court's
decision in Reyes overturned the three-prong test portion of Robertson because it contained
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the phrase and the requirement of the three-prong test. However, the decision in Reyes could
not say that the instruction as a whole in Robertson should be overturned and remanded for
a new trial since the instruction in Robertson was not before the court. The decision in Reyes
could only correct the error in the law that was created based upon the decision in Robertson
and brought before the court in Reyes. The court could not hear anything that was at issue
in Robertson when it determined Reyes because Robertson9 s issues were not before the court.
Although Robertson's jury instruction conveyed the same message as the phrase
"obviate all reasonable doubt" without using the phrase, it was correct for his instruction to
do so at the time of his appeal. This Court cannot go back sua sponte and give Robertson a
new trial based on his instruction. Reyes was not asking to use Robertson's instruction in his
matter he was only asking for the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" to be used at his trial
because the first prong of the test in Robertson indicated that this phrase needed to be used.
The State's argument that Reyes did not overturn Robertson's instruction and therefore his
reasonable doubt jury instruction is sound makes it appear as though every reasonable doubt
jury instruction that has ever been upheld by an appellate court is a sound instruction because
they were not specifically addressed by Reyes. Reyes completely overturned Robertson even
though it did not specifically address his reasonable doubt jury instruction, which at the time
of his appeal and trial was correct under current law. If Robertson felt like his instruction
was incorrect, then it is his duty to bring that issue before the court, not for this Court to
address that issue in Reyes.
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VIII. NO ARGUMENT NEED BE ARTICULATED TO CREATE THE
SUBSTANTIAL RISK...IT IS INHERENT IN THE USE OF THE PHRASE
In the Brief of Respondent the state attempts to argue that "the prosecutors did not
argue that a reasonable doubt must be defined before it could serve as a basis for an
acquittal." Brief of Respondent at p. 8. The State also cites to the language included in
Reyes by this Court that states, "to the extent that the Robertson obviate test would permit
the State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test works
to improperly diminish the State's burden." Reyes at 128. Brief ofRespondent at p. 11.
In the instant matter, although the State did not argue that it need only obviate doubts
that were sufficiently defined the language "the State must obviate all reasonable doubt" was
in the jury instruction and this permitted the State to do so if they decided to. Because this
Court in Reyes determined that the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" created a
substantial risk the State did not have to make the argument that they need only obviate
doubts that were sufficiently defined because the "obviate all reasonable doubt" phase
permitted them to do so. Because Robertson permitted the State to make this argument, this
Court overturned Robertson. Therefore, the State did not need to make the argument that the
jury obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, because the phrase "obviate all reasonable
doubt" in the jury instruction created the risk that they could do just that. The risk in this
matter exists in the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt", and simply by the use of this
phrase the State was permitted to make that argument even though they did not.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Austin respectfully requests that this Court reverse die
decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter for a new trial.
DATED this f C ^
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